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a b s t r a c t
AsA(H1N1) inﬂuenza enters the post-pandemic phase, health authorities around theworld are reviewing
the response to the pandemic. To ensure this process enhances future preparations, it is essential that
perspectivesare included fromall relevant stakeholders, includingvaccinemanufacturers. Thispaperout-
lines the contribution of R&D-based inﬂuenza vaccine producers to the pandemic response, and explores
lessons that can be learned to improve future preparedness.
The emergence of 2009 A(H1N1) inﬂuenza led to unprecedented collaboration between global health
authorities, scientists and manufacturers, resulting in the most comprehensive pandemic response ever
undertaken, with a number of vaccines approved for use three months after the pandemic declaration.
This responsewas only possible because of the extensive preparations undertaken during the last decade.
During this period, manufacturers greatly increased inﬂuenza vaccine production capacity, and esti-
mates suggest a further doubling of capacity by 2014. Producers also introduced cell-culture technology,
while adjuvant and whole virion technologies signiﬁcantly reduced pandemic vaccine antigen content.
This substantially increased pandemic vaccine production capacity, which in July 2009 WHO estimated
reached 4.9 billion doses per annum.Manufacturers also workedwith health authorities to establish risk
management plans for robust vaccine surveillance during the pandemic. Individual producers pledged
signiﬁcant donations of vaccine doses and tiered-pricing approaches for developing country supply.
Based on the pandemic experience, a number of improvementswould strengthen future preparedness.
Technical improvements to rapidly select optimal vaccine viruses, and processes to speed up vaccine
standardization, could accelerate andextendvaccine availability. Establishing vaccine supply agreements
beforehand would avoid the need for complex discussions during a period of intense time pressure.
Enhancing international regulatory co-operation andmutual recognition of approvals could accelerate
vaccine supply, while maintaining safety standards. Strengthening communications with the public and
healthcare workers using new approaches and new channels could help improve vaccine uptake. Finally,
increasing seasonal vaccine coverage will be particularly important to extend and sustain pandemic
vaccine production capacity.
© 2010 Elsevier Ltd. 
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. Introduction
In June 2009,WHOdeclared the ﬁrst inﬂuenza pandemic in over
0 years. The emergence of this new inﬂuenza virus initiated a
obust and rapid response from public health partners around the
orld, including the research-based vaccine industry. As the 2009
(H1N1) virus enters its post-pandemic phase, international insti-
utions, national governments and individual manufacturers are
onducting reviews to identify which aspects of the response were
uccessful, andwhich canbe improved. As part of this global assess-
ent process, the international and European organizations that
epresent the world’s major inﬂuenza vaccine manufacturers (the
FPMA IVS taskforce and EVM respectively) have worked together
o compile an industry perspective. This is intended to complement
he reviews conducted by other organizations, and ultimately to
elp inform future preparedness activities.
. The vaccine industry’s role
Vaccines are a crucial tool in the ﬁght against pandemic
nﬂuenza, and consequently the vaccine industry has an essential
ole to play when called on by public health authorities. In answer-
ng this call, themanufacturers’ role is clear: the rapiddevelopment,
roduction and supply of safe and effective pandemic vaccines to
nable the immunization of local populations. However, fulﬁlling
his role is challenging. Inﬂuenza vaccine manufacture is complex
nd time consuming, and requires specialist facilities and highly
rained personnel. In addition, the timely provision of vaccines is
ot entirely controlled by manufacturers, and involves the col-
aboration of other organizations, for instance to ensure efﬁcient
egulatory review or provide logistical infrastructure.
Following the emergence of the 2009 A(H1N1) pandemic strain,
broad collaboration of international institutions, governments,
ublic health authorities, scientists and vaccine producers came
ogether to address these challenges. These partners went on to
ount the most complete pandemic response ever undertaken.
Rapid supply of pandemic vaccines. Three months after the
June 2009 pandemic declaration, several manufacturers of inac-
tivated and live attenuated vaccines had completed vaccine
development, received regulatory authorization and undertaken
production scale-up (see Fig. 1). Soon afterwards, a number of
health authorities initiated immunization programs, with others
following in the subsequent weeks and months. By Decem-
ber, over 30 vaccines had received approval, and more than 50
Fig. 1. Production process for initial batches of 2009 A(H1N1) inﬂuenza vaccines. (2011) 1135–1138
countries had started vaccination programs [1]. Manufacturers
went on to supply signiﬁcant quantities of pandemic vaccines to
many countries around the world, while also supplying seasonal
inﬂuenza vaccines to meet local needs in both the Northern and
Southernhemispheres. The speedof this responsewasonlypossi-
blebecauseof thepreparationsundertaken in theyearspreceding
the 2009 pandemic.
• Safe supply of pandemic vaccines. Prior to the A(H1N1) pandemic,
manufacturers had amassed many decades of experience pro-
ducing seasonal inﬂuenza vaccines, and had also developed and
tested many prototype pandemic vaccines. Building on these
preparations, manufacturers conducted clinical trials with new
A(H1N1) vaccines, to ensure they met regulatory and public
health authorities’ safety requirements. Subsequently, the vac-
cines’ safety was conﬁrmed by extensive surveillance of vaccine
use inmillions of people, including themore than 40million vac-
cinated in Europe and nearly 127million doses distributed in the
US by the end of March 2010 [2,3].
• Meeting health authorities’ needs. As the pandemic progressed,
vaccine demand changed and in many countries uptake was
lower than anticipated. As a result, a number of governments
revised their vaccine needs downwards, and manufacturers
worked with these countries to meet the new requirements
where possible.
3. A decade of pandemic preparations
Formany years, international institutions, such asWHO and the
European Union, called for pandemic preparations [4,5]. Manufac-
turers answered this call, and over the last 10 years committed
signiﬁcant resources to preparedness despite uncertain ﬁnan-
cial returns, and as a result enhanced the world’s response
capabilities.
• Substantial increase in vaccine production capacity. Over a period
of years, manufacturers steadily increased seasonal inﬂuenza
vaccine supply. Independent estimates suggest capacity could
continue to expand to approximately 1.4 billion seasonal doses
per annum by 2014 [6]. In addition, manufacturers developed
live attenuated, adjuvanted and whole virion inactivated pan-
demic vaccines, which met regulatory requirements with far
lower antigen contents than are used in seasonal inactivated vac-
cines. By utilizing 3.75g–7.5g of antigen permonovalent dose
[7–11], rather than the 45g typically contained in inactivated
trivalent seasonal vaccines [12,13], these pandemic vaccines in
effect stretched antigen utilization 600–1200%. The combination
of these advances increased pandemic vaccine production capac-
ity signiﬁcantly, with WHO estimating in July 2009 that it had
reached 4.9 billion doses per year [14].
• Advanced technologies enhanced preparedness. Earlier research
with other inﬂuenza viruses, such as A(H5N1) and seasonal
strains, suggested that vaccine strategies incorporating adju-
vant technologies, whole virion inactivated vaccines and live
attenuated vaccine approaches may also offer broader immunity
[15–17]. Additionally, manufacturers developed new generation
adjuvanted and non-adjuvanted pandemic vaccines using cell
culture biotechnologies, and these were supplied to a number
of countries during the A(H1N1) pandemic, alongside wide-scale
provision of traditional egg-produced vaccines.
• Vaccination monitoring systems ensured safety. Prior to the pan-
demic outbreak, manufacturers established risk management
plans as part of their vaccine development activities. These
enabled the wide-scale safety surveillance of pandemic vaccina-
tion programs.
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. Industry’s contribution to a global response
During the2009pandemic, vaccinemanufacturersprovided fur-
her contributions in addition to responding to requests for vaccine
evelopment and supply. Recognizing the importance of broadvac-
ine access, individual manufacturers put in place a number of
easures to enhance global access. Producers also provided clinical
ata and production information to enable the timely development
f vaccination policies by public health authorities.
Signiﬁcant vaccine donations. Individual producers pledged 166
million doses of A(H1N1) vaccines to help meet the WHO’s 200
million dose target for developing country supply [18].
Reserved production capacity and tiered-pricing. In recognition of
countries’ differing levels of economic development, a number of
manufacturers put in place approaches to assist supply to devel-
oping countries.
Financial and technical support for the WHO system. Manufactur-
ers worked closely with WHO network laboratories to accelerate
production initiation and scale up. These laboratories, supported
ﬁnancially bymanufacturers, produced isolates and high-growth
reassortant vaccine viruses, which inactivated-vaccine produc-
ers rapidly tested and provided data on growth characteristics to
help yield improvement efforts. Producers also supplied concen-
trated antigen to the WHO network for vaccine standardization.
These measures helped accelerate and ultimately increase vac-
cine availability.
Data provision for health authority policy development. Manu-
facturers undertook extensive clinical studies with A(H1N1)
vaccines, andprovidedpublic health authoritieswith clinical data
to enable the timely development of immunization policies. This
included the provision of preliminary data to the WHO Strategic
Advisory Group of Experts on Immunization to enable the Group
to formulate independent advice on pandemic vaccine use [19].
Throughout the production of pandemic vaccines,manufacturers
provided supply data to assist authorities’ planning activities, as
well as establishing distribution mechanisms to enhance avail-
ability.
. Lessons from the 2009 pandemic
It is clear that the emergence and subsequent global spread of
009 A(H1N1) inﬂuenza prompted the largest pandemic response
ver mounted. Many aspects of this undertaking were highly
ositive. However, not surprisingly, the response also revealed a
umber of areas where improvements could be made.
Assessments by health authorities and other stakeholders will
lay an important role in determining the lessons that can be
earned from the 2009 pandemic. The review undertaken by the
FPMA IVS andEVMgroups can complement this process, providing
perspective from the vaccine industry.
Record levels of preparedness. Over many years, public health
partners, including vaccine manufacturers, undertook extensive
preparations to combat future inﬂuenza pandemics. This process
accelerated signiﬁcantly following the rapid spread of A(H5N1)
avian viruses. Without this level of preparedness, the 2009
response would not have been possible. This situation clearly
demonstrates the need for pandemic preparations to continue
as a high priority.
Scientiﬁc and technical collaboration. The initial stages of A(H1N1)
inactivated vaccine virus development and production scale-up
proved highly challenging. As a result, industry scientists worked
closely with WHO network colleagues to improve yields from
the viruses and to provide materials for vaccine standardization. (2011) 1135–1138 1137
In addition, methods for the rapid development of high-yielding
reverse genetics vaccine virus strains were shared with public
health agencies andmade available via journal publications. This
spirit of voluntary collaboration and ﬂexibility amongst public
health partners can be built upon to strengthen future prepared-
ness.
• Vaccine safety monitoring. The implementation of previously
established monitoring plans allowed the rapid conﬁrmation of
A(H1N1) vaccine safety. Future preparedness efforts should focus
onensuringvaccine safety through theuseofﬂexible andefﬁcient
surveillance systems.
• A number of improvements could complement the positive ele-
ments outlined above.
• Technical enhancements. Initial A(H1N1) inactivated vaccine virus
production yields were only 1/3–1/2 of those achieved with
good seasonal strains [20]. Overcoming thismajor issue impacted
on early inactivated vaccine availability. Consequently, systems
that would allow the WHO network to evaluate multiple vac-
cine viruses in parallel and select those with optimal growth
characteristics could both speed up and increase vaccine supply.
Similarly, the introduction of alternative vaccine standardization
technologies, such as HPLC or mass spectrometry, could enable
earlier clinical testing and vaccine availability.
• Enhancing decision-making processes. The further development of
rapid pandemic epidemiological research capabilities could help
underpin assessments of the likely course and impact of future
outbreaks. This could help inform policy decision making and
enhance modeling of vaccine demand.
• Pre-establishing supply agreements. At the outbreak of the
A(H1N1) pandemic, many countries did not have vaccine supply
agreements in place. As a result, large numbers of complex nego-
tiations had to be undertaken in parallel with signiﬁcant time
pressures on all parties. The establishment of appropriate agree-
ments prior to a pandemic would avoid this situation, and assist
health departments and manufacturers with logistical planning.
• Streamlining regulatory processes. A number of regulatory pro-
cedures introduced to accelerate pandemic vaccine assessment
worked well. However, others resulted in duplication and addi-
tional bureaucracy. For instance, some authorities requested
duplicate lot release testing, andWHOpre-qualiﬁcation required
production site visits even when these had been completed by
local regulatory agencies or previously by WHO for seasonal
vaccines. Consequently, the recognition of existing regulatory
authorizations and enhanced co-operation could speed up vac-
cine supply, while continuing to ensure robust safety standards.
• Regional collaboration. The occurrence of the ﬁrst pandemic in
decades provided a number of opportunities for supra-national
co-operation that were not seized upon. For instance, although
Europe-wide effectiveness studies were conducted, the opportu-
nitywasnot taken to combine these in a centralized, co-ordinated
manner with European safety studies; similarly, co-ordinated
pan-European safety studies should be conducted as an inte-
gral component of future vaccine surveillance. The pandemic
also reinforced the need to enhance regional virus surveillance
and epidemiology capabilities, particularly in developing regions
such as Africa.
• Overcoming communications challenges. For the ﬁrst time during
a pandemic, modern electronic communications played a high
proﬁle role. New channels greatly speed up and broaden com-
munications, but they also enable the rapid spread of unscientiﬁc
and unbalanced information. During the 2009 pandemic, this
mayhave ampliﬁed public concern regarding pandemic vaccines,
and in some instances the use of social media may have eroded
public conﬁdence in vaccine safety. The impact of thesenewcom-
munication methods may have played a role in the low uptake
of A(H1N1) vaccines. Even amongst key target groups, vaccina-
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tion rates remained low (for example, in the US only 37.1% of
healthcare workers were vaccinated by mid-January 2010 [21]).
In future, it will be important to utilize new communication
approaches to address concerns over vaccine safety, build public
trust and convince those at risk of the importance of vaccination.
In addition, further transparency about the different roles of all
stakeholders involved in theprocessof immunizationassessment
and policy making could help avoid misconceptions about the
nature of the collaboration required to protect against pandemic
inﬂuenza.
. Conclusions
For many years, the vaccine industry has been committed to
andemic preparations, and has contributedmajor resources to the
eld as requested by health authorities. Record levels of prepared-
ess and collaboration between public health partners enabled
anufacturers to answer the call for safe and effective A(H1N1)
accines, and to go on to supply signiﬁcant quantities starting just
hree months after the pandemic declaration.
However, despite the magnitude and speed of the 2009 pan-
emic response, there remain areas for improvement. Amongst
he issues likely to be explored by ongoing reviews, is the poten-
ial scale of future vaccine provision. Although the severity of the
ecent pandemicwas relativelymild, and vaccine demandwas low,
his cannot be relied on in future. WHO estimated that production
apacity stood at 4.9 billion doses per annum, but while this repre-
ents a step change in global capabilities it may be insufﬁcient for
lobal populations in future. Many solutions have been suggested
o ﬁll the gap, such as local capacity building and technology trans-
er, and initiatives are progressing in both of these areas. However,
andemic vaccine production capacity can only be increased and
ustained through thewideruseof seasonal vaccines.During recent
ears, seasonal vaccine usage has failed to match the growth in
roduction capacity, and uptake has remained low even amongst
number of high risk groups. By providing strong policy support
nd implementing existing vaccination recommendations, govern-
ents canhelp protect local populations against the ongoing threat
osed by seasonal inﬂuenza, while simultaneously extending and
ustaining the world’s ability to combat the next, inevitable pan-
emic.
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